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Search this site Go to... -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Special report: space shuttle Columbia Space shuttle Columbia archived articles In this section Report into shuttle loss attacks 'lax' Nasa safety Email told fatal shuttle it was safe How warning signs were ignored before disaster shuttle's launch Tape reveals shuttle crew's last minutes Nasa team feared shuttle wing failure Trauma support for orbiting crew Missing tile 'not responsible' for Columbia crash 'Lock the doors' - words that marked loss of hope for shuttle Nasa releases final transmissions of doomed shuttle Orbiting debris may have brought down Columbia Object of the week: Space shuttle debris Shuttle looters arrested as search goes on Photos may hold clue to shuttle 90-second nightmare of shuttle crew Rockets and risk Shuttle disaster report criticises Nasa Agencies Tuesday August 26, 2003 A future space shuttle mission could suffer the same fate as the Columbia and Challenger crafts if Nasa does not deal with "persistant, systematic flaws" in its organisation, investigators said today. A report into Columbia's break up as it re-entered the Earth's atmosphere in February this year said that a schedule-driven culture starved of funding and burdened with an insufficient safety programme was as much to blame for death of its seven astronauts as mechanical failings. It said that Nasa's attitude towards safety had improved little since the 1986 Challenger disaster and mission managers at the space agency had fallen into the habit of accepting some flaws as normal. The root causes of the Columbia disaster were also an "echo" of the Challenger accident, repeated for 20-years and embedded in Nasa's organisational system. "The [investigation] board recognised early on that the accident was probably not an anomolous, random event, but rather likely rooted in to some degree in Nasa's history and the human space flight programme's culture," the report explained. Sean O'Keefe, who heads Nasa, had warned space workers earlier this summer that they should prepare themselves for a report that would be "really ugly". The report said Nasa managers missed opportunities during Columbia's last mission to evaluate possible damage to the craft's heat shield from a strike on the left wing by flying foam insulation. Such insulation strikes had occurred on previous missions and it said Nasa managers had come to view them as an acceptable abnormality that posed no safety risk. This attitude also contributed to the lack of interest in getting spy satellite photos of Columbia, images that might have identified the extent of damage on the shuttle, and led to incorrect conclusions. But most of all, the report noted, there was "ineffective leadership" that "failed to fulfil the implicit contract to do whatever is possible to ensure the safety of the crew". Management techniques in Nasa, the report said, discouraged dissenting views on safety issues and ultimately created "blind spots" about the risk to the space shuttle of the foam insulation impact. Throughout its history, the report found, "Nasa has consistently struggled to achieve viable safety programs" but the agency effort "has fallen short of its mark." The investigators made 29 recommendations, including changes it said Nasa must make to start flying again and long-range changes that will alter the space agency culture. "The changes we recommend will be difficult to accomplish - and will be internally resisted," the report said. But it said it supports launching the next shuttle at "the earliest date" consistent with safety. The report concluded that the shuttle is "not inherently unsafe" and outlined other recommendations that it said should allow Nasa to continue flying shuttles for another 10 or even 20 years. Some blame in the report was shifted to Congress and the White House because for almost a decade Nasa lived on a lean budget that cut 13% of its purchasing power from 1993 to 2002. At the same time, it was under pressure to build the international space station and cut costs by reducing its staff and contractor work force from about 32,000 in 1991 to just over 19,000 in 1997. "The White House, Congress and Nasa leadership exerted constant pressure to reduce or at least freeze operating costs [as a result] safety and support upgrades were delayed or deferred, and shuttle infrastructure was allowed to deteriorate," it said. Special reports Space shuttle Columbia Space exploration Interactive guide How the tragedy unfolded Weblog Space shuttle Columbia In pictures Columbia shuttle tragedy 03.02.2003: The astronauts who lost their lives Useful links Kennedy space centre, Cape Canaveral Nasa homepage Nasa: human space flight (shuttle homepage) Space.com Houston Space Chronicle Nasawatch (not a Nasa site) |
